### Cover and Decomposition Attack on Elliptic Curves

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Cover and decomposition attack

### Section 1

### Known attacks of the ECDLP

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### Discrete logarithm problem

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## Discrete logarithm problem

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#### Difficulty is related to the group:

- Generic attacks: complexity in  $\Omega(\max(\alpha_i \sqrt{p_i}))$  if  $\#G = \prod_i p_i^{\alpha_i}$
- ②  $G \subset (\mathbb{F}_q^*, \times)$ : index calculus method with complexity in  $L_q(1/3)$ where  $L_q(\alpha) = exp(c(\log q)^{\alpha}(\log \log q)^{1-\alpha})$ .
- G ⊂ (J<sub>C</sub>(F<sub>q</sub>), +): index calculus method with sub-exponential complexity (depending of the genus g > 2)

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# Basic outline of index calculus methods (additive notations)

$$\textbf{0} \ \ \mathsf{Choice of a factor base:} \ \ \mathcal{F} = \{g_1, \ldots, g_N\} \subset G$$

2 Relation search: decompose  $a_i \cdot g + b_i \cdot h(a_i, b_i \text{ random})$  into  $\mathcal{F}$ 

$$a_i \cdot g + b_i \cdot h = \sum_{j=1}^N c_{i,j} \cdot g_j$$

Solution Linear algebra: once k relations found (k > N)

- construct the matrices  $A = \begin{pmatrix} a_i & b_i \end{pmatrix}_{1 \le i \le k}$  and  $M = \begin{pmatrix} c_{i,j} \end{pmatrix}_{1 \le i \le k}$
- find  $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_k) \in \ker({}^tM)$  such that  $vA \neq 0 \mod \#G$
- compute the solution of DLP:  $x = -(\sum_i a_i v_i) / (\sum_i b_i v_i) \mod \#G$

#### Hardness of ECDLP

#### **ECDLP**

Given  $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  and  $Q \in \langle P \rangle$ , find x such that Q = [x]P

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#### Specific attacks on few families of curves:

- Ourves defined over prime fields
  - lift to characteristic zero fields: anomalous curves
  - ▶ transfer to  $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}^*$  via pairings: curves with small embedding degree
  - otherwise only generic attacks (Pollard's Rho)

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- ② Curves defined over extension fields
  - ▶ Weil descent: transfer from  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})$  to  $J_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbb{F}_p)$  where  $\mathcal{C}$  has genus  $g \ge n$
  - direct index calculus methods on  $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})$

### Lift of the ECDLP via cover maps

 $\pi:\mathcal{C}\to E$  cover map where  $\mathcal C$  curve defined over  $\mathbb F_q$  and E elliptic curve defined over  $\mathbb F_{q^n}$ 

• transfer the DLP from  $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$  to  $\mathcal{J}_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbb{F}_q)$ 

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2 use index calculus on  $J_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbb{F}_q)$ : if  $\mathcal{C}$  is hyperelliptic with small genus g

- ▶ factor base:  $\mathcal{F} = \{D \sim (u, v) : \deg(u) = 1\}$  (Mumford representation)
- decomposition: D = (u, v) decomposes in  $\mathcal{F} \Rightarrow u$  is split over  $\mathbb{F}_q$
- complexity in  $q^{2-2/g}$  as  $q \to \infty$ , g fixed

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#### Main difficulty : find a convenient curve $\ensuremath{\mathcal{C}}$ with a genus small enough

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### The GHS construction

#### Gaudry-Heß-Smart (binary fields), Diem (odd characteristic case)

Given an elliptic curve  $E_{|\mathbb{F}_{q^n}}$  and a degree 2 map  $E \to \mathbb{P}^1$ , construct a curve  $\mathcal{C}_{|\mathbb{F}_q}$  and a cover map  $\pi : \mathcal{C} \to E$ .

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Problem: for most elliptic curves, g is of the order of  $2^n$ 

- Index calculus on  $J_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbb{F}_q)$  usually slower than generic methods on  $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$
- Possibility of using isogenies from *E* to a vulnerable curve [Galbraith]
  → increase the number of vulnerable curves

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#### Decomposition attack

Idea from Gaudry and Diem: no transfer, but apply directly index calculus on  $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$  (or  $J_H(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$ )

#### Principle

• Factor base:

 $\mathcal{F} = \{ D_Q \in J_H(\mathbb{F}_{q^n}) : D_Q \sim (Q) - (\mathcal{O}_H), Q \in H(\mathbb{F}_{q^n}), x(Q) \in \mathbb{F}_q \}$ 

• Decomposition of an arbitrary divisor  $D \in J_H(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$  into ng divisors of the factor base  $D \sim \sum_{i=1}^{ng} ((Q_i) - (\mathcal{O}_H))$ 

• complexity in 
$$q^{2-2/ng}$$
 as  $q o \infty$ 

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 complexity in  $q^{2-2/\,ng}$  as  $q o\infty$ 

- interesting when g is small  $(g \leq 3)$
- every curves are equally weak under this attack
- decomposition is harder (need to solve polynomial systems)

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Nagao's approach for decompositions

How to check if D = (u, v) can be decomposed ?

$$D + \sum_{i=1}^{ng} \left( (Q_i) - (\mathcal{O}_H) \right) \sim 0 \Leftrightarrow D + \sum_{i=1}^{ng} \left( (Q_i) - (\mathcal{O}_H) \right) = div(f)$$

where  $f \in \mathcal{L}(ng(\mathcal{O}_H) - D)$ ,  $\mathbb{F}_{q^n}$ -vector space of dim.  $\ell = (n-1)g + 1$ 

- Polynomial  $F_{\lambda_1,...,\lambda_\ell}(X)$  with roots  $x(Q_1),\ldots,x(Q_{ng})$
- *F*<sub>λ1,...,λℓ</sub> ∈ 𝔽<sub>q</sub>[X] ⇔ components of the λ<sub>i</sub> in a (𝔽<sub>q<sup>n</sup></sub>/𝔽<sub>q</sub>)-linear base satisfy a system of polynomial equations
- Decomposition of D ↔ solve a quadratic polynomial system over 𝔽<sub>q</sub> of (n-1)ng equations and variables + test if F<sub>λ1,...,λℓ</sub> is split in 𝔽<sub>q</sub>[X]

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- complexity of the polynomial system resolution  $\rightarrow$  relevant approach only for *n* and *g* small enough
- in the elliptic case: use Semaev's summation polynomials instead

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### Section 2

### A new index calculus method

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#### Decomposition attacks

## A modified relation search

In practice, decompositions as  $D \sim \sum_{i=1}^{ng} \left( (Q_i) - (\mathcal{O}_H) \right)$  are too slow to compute

#### Improvement

Compute relations between elements of  $\mathcal{F}$ :  $\sum_{i=1}^{ng+2} ((Q_i) - (\mathcal{O}_H)) \sim 0$ 

- Resolution of an underdetermined quadratic polynomial system of n(n-1)g + 2n 2 equations in n(n-1)g + 2n variables.
- After initial precomputation, each specialization of the last two variables yields an easy to solve system.
- Can be combined with a sieving technique to avoid factorizing the resulting polynomial  $F_{\lambda_1,...,\lambda_\ell}$ .

Still need a few Nagao's style decompositions to actually solve the DLP (descent phase).

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### A combined attack

#### Let $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^n})$ elliptic curve such that

- $\bullet$  GHS provides covering curves  ${\cal C}$  with too large genus
- *n* is too large for a practical decomposition attack

#### Cover and decomposition attack

If n composite, combine both approaches

- **(**) use GHS on the subextension  $\mathbb{F}_{q^n}/\mathbb{F}_{q^d}$  to transfer the DL to  $\mathcal{J}_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbb{F}_{q^d})$
- ② use decomposition attack on  $J_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbb{F}_{q^d})$  with base field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  to solve the DLP

#### Genus 3 cover

#### Most favorable case for this combined attack:

- extension degree n = 6 (occurs for OEF), and
- $E_{|\mathbb{F}_{q^6}}$  has a genus 3 cover by  $H_{|\mathbb{F}_{q^2}}$ 
  - ightarrow occurs for  $\Theta(q^4)$  curves directly [Thériault, Momose-Chao]
  - $\rightarrow$  for most curves after an isogeny walk

On curves defined over such extension fields:

• GHS: cover  $\mathcal{C}_{|\mathbb{F}_q}$  with genus  $g \geq 9$  and with equality for less than  $q^3$  curves

 $\rightsquigarrow$  index calculus on  $J_{\mathcal{C}}(\mathbb{F}_q)$  is slower

• direct decomposition attack fails to compute any relation

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#### Complexity and comparison with other attacks

Estimations for *E* elliptic curve defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^6}$  with  $|p| \simeq 27$  bits and  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^6}) = 4\ell$  with  $\ell$  a 160-bit prime

Attack	Asymptotic	162-bit example	Ratio of vulnerable curves
	complexity	cost	(without isogeny walk)
Pollard	<i>р</i> <sup>3</sup>	2 <sup>99</sup>	1
Ind. calc. on $H_{ \mathbb{F}_{p^2}}$ , $g(H) = 3$	p <sup>8/3</sup>	2 <sup>90</sup>	$1/p^{2}$
Ind. calc. on $H_{ \mathbb{F}_p}$ , $g(H) = 9$	p <sup>16/9</sup>	2 <sup>68</sup>	$\leq 1/p^3$
Decomp. on $E_{ \mathbb{F}_{(p^2)^3}}$	p <sup>8/3</sup>	2 <sup>97</sup>	1
Decomp. on $E_{ \mathbb{F}_{p^6}}$	p <sup>5/3</sup>	2 <sup>135</sup>	1
Decomp. on $H_{ \mathbb{F}_{p^2}}$ , $g(H) = 3$	p <sup>5/3</sup>	2 <sup>65</sup>	$1/p^{2}$
Decomp. on $H_{ \mathbb{F}_{p^3}}$ , $g(H) = 2$	p <sup>5/3</sup>	2 <sup>112</sup>	1

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### A 130-bit example

*E* :  $y^2 = (x - c)(x - \alpha)(x - \sigma(\alpha))$  defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^6}$  where  $p = 2^{22} + 15$ , such that  $\#E = 4 \cdot 1361158674614712334466525985682062201601$ .

Decomposition on the genus 3 hyperelliptic curve  $H_{|\mathbb{F}_{n^2}}$  covering E:

- Relation search:
  - lex GB of a system of 10 eq. and 8 var. in 1 min (Magma on a 2.6 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo proc)
  - sieving phase: ≃ 25 · p relations in about 1 h with 200 cores (2.93 GHz quadri-core Intel Xeon 5550 proc) ~→ 750 times faster than Nagao's

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  - Structured Gaussian elimination: 1 357 sec on a single core ~> reduces by a factor 3 the number of unknowns
  - Lanczos algorithm: 27 h16 min on 128 cores (MPI communications)
  - Logarithms of all remaining elements in the factor base obtained in 10 min on a single core

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- Structured Gaussian elimination: 1357 sec on a single core → reduces by a factor 3 the number of unknowns
- Lanczos algorithm: 27 h16 min on 128 cores (MPI communications)
- Logarithms of all remaining elements in the factor base obtained in 10 min on a single core
- 3 Descent phase:  $\simeq 10$  sec for one point on a single core

#### Conclusion

- New index calculus algorithm to compute DL on elliptic curves defined over extension fields of composite degree
- Efficient attack on elliptic curves defined over sextic extension field
   → practical resolution of DLP on a 130-bit elliptic curve in
   3700 CPU hours or 30 h real time with ≤ 200 cores
- Also available on every elliptic curves defined over a degree 4 extension field, but advantage over generic methods less significant
- How to target more curves?